prohairesis

προαίρεσις

Pronunciation

proh-AIR-uh-suhss or proh-EER-uh-siss

Definition

Prohairesis or proairesis (προαίρεσις) is our faculty of choice and can be translated as "will," "volition," "intention," or "moral choice." Some think of this as our sphere of choice (i.e., what is up to us).

Prohairesis vs Hêgemonikon

To understand prohairesis, we must first understand hêgemonikon.

Hêgemonikon is the ruling faculty of the mind, often associated by the Stoics with the self.

Our ruling faculty controls our body and psychological responses. The hêgemonikon is comprised of many faculties: sensation (sight, taste, touch, hearing, and smell), perception, sexual reproduction, voice (communication), and rationality. The core rational faculties include impression, reflection, assent, and impulse.

Impression: a representation in the mind. Impression is a metaphor akin to the impression one makes when pressing a signet ring into a wax seal. An impression is not the ring itself but a representation of it. Likewise, the Stoics were materialists who believed that everything was composed of matter. Impressions were changes in the mind that represented the world around it.

Reflection: use of reason about whether an impression accurately represents reality. Is this impression true or false?

Assent: a judgment about an impression.

Impulse: a psychological or motivational force towards or away from an object (i.e., impression). In an animal sense, an animal sees food and gets an impulse towards it.

Prohairesis is part of the hêgemonikon, but it only contains reflection, assent, and impulse. Impressions are not part of prohairesis because they are not up to us. We cannot choose how an impression arrives. It just does. However, we can choose to reflect on that impression; assent that the impression is true; and move toward the impression if we judge it to be good or away from it if we judge it to be evil. For animals, it is natural to go from impression directly to impulse. For humans, when we learn to reflect, we sometimes give up what seems good or natural so someone else will benefit. If we don't reflect, we risk acting like animals. Additionally, if an impression is incorrect, we may form the wrong impulse to act. And, since reflection, assent, and impulse are up to us, Epictetus believes that prohairesis represents the true Stoic self. This is where we live our lives — in our choices.[1]

When we choose virtuous actions, we improve the capacity of our faculty of choice. This is called building a good character. When we act viciously, we reinforce bad habits, degrade our faculty of choice, lessen our capacity to choose well, and become more enslaved to our base impulses. This is why it feels good to build discipline. Discipline leads to choosing better.

Thoughts of Others

From Daily Stoic: The term goes back to Aristotle’s Ethics and has been traditionally translated there as “purposive choice.” A. A. Long, in an attempt to free it from modern moral concepts, translates it as “volition,” a term we find too remote from everyday understanding—for generations prior it was translated as “moral purpose” (W. A. Oldfather, George Long, and others). We are avoiding loading the term with either the moral sense of Christian tradition or the modernist sense of will, so heavily colored since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. A. A. Long sees this as Epictetus’s preferred term for what distinguishes human beings from animals (which also have hêgemonikon in his reading of Epictetus; Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, p. 211), something not even the gods can touch (Discourses 1.1.23). The term is used sixty-nine times in the Discourses (1.4. 18–22, 1.18. 21–23, 1.22.10, 1.29. 1–4a, 2.1. 12–13, 2.5. 4–5, 2.6.25, 2.10.1, 2.16. 1–2a, 2.22. 19–20, 3.1. 39b–40a, 3.3. 18–19, 3.7.5, 3.10.18, 3.19. 2–3, 3.21. 1–3, 3.22.13, 4.4.23, 4.5. 34–37) and six times in the Enchiridion (13). Marcus uses it five times in the negative (ἀπροαίρετα), or outside of our choice, and three times in the positive sense of deliberate choice (3.6, 6.41, 8.56, 12.3, 12.33). Where this is the focal point of Epictetus’s system, Marcus leans heavily to hêgemonikon.[2]

Citations

1. Ontiveros, C. & Tremblay, M. (Hosts). (2023, March 3). Stoic Psychology: Epictetus on Why What You Think is Up to You (Episode 23) [Audio podcast episode]. In Stoa Conversations: Stoicism Applied https://stoameditation.com/blog/stoic-psychology-why-what-you-think-is-up-to-you/

2. Holiday, R. & Hanselman, S. (2016). A Model of Late Stoic Practice and Glossary of Key Terms and Passages. Daily Stoic. Retrieved January 3, 2026. https://dailystoic.com/glossary/